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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Relationship speciﬁc investments are important in a wide variety of economic transac-
tions. As has long been recognized, when contracts are incomplete, speciﬁc investments
may be undersupplied due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation by one of the
trading partners. The holdup problem underlies a number of prominent theories of in-
stitutions, in which particular organizational forms, such as ﬁrms or governments, are
rationalized as means of curbing ex-post opportunism.1 C h ea n dH a u s c h( 1 9 9 9 )h a v er e -
cently shown that ‘cooperative’ investments, those that directly beneﬁt the other trading
partner — as when a tenant undertakes an improvement of his landlord’s property — are
particularly susceptible to holdup. In this case, when commitment by the parties not to
renegotiate ex-post is impossible, no contract may be able to protect the investor (see also
Hart and Moore, 1999, on the issue of commitment).
Despite the centrality of holdup problems in economics, there is remarkably little di-
rect evidence on their quantitative importance, or on the extent to which commitment
mechanisms mitigate holdup.2 This paper begins to ﬁll these lacunae by examining coop-
erative investment within the classic principal-agent relationship, that between landlord
and tenant. In this context, we ask two basic questions: (1) Does the threat of holdup
signiﬁcantly constrain speciﬁc investment? and (2) Is lack of committment ubiquitous, or
are some relationships characterized by greater committment, and hence a lower holdup
threat, than others?
Banerjee, et al. (2002) also emphasize contractual incompleteness in their investiga-
tion of the impact of tenancy reform on farm productivity in one Indian state. However,
because they lack data on investments potentially subject to holdup, they cannot distin-
guish the investment channel from other eﬀects of tenancy reform. There are, to be sure,
micro-level studies showing that insecure property rights in land create a disincentive to
invest (e.g., Besley, 1995; Jacoby, et al., 2002), but without information on the extent of
committment this evidence says little about how land tenancy aﬀects investment. The
setting for our investigation is rural Pakistan, where land-leasing under both crop-sharing
and ﬁxed rental arrangements is pervasive. The empirical analysis compares land-speciﬁc
1See, e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
Williamson (1975), North and Weingast (1989).
2Joskow (1987) ﬁnds that longer term contracts are more common as the degree of relationship speciﬁc
investment increases, but in a context where long-term contracting is feasible. His paper does not examine
the investment decision conditional on contractual form. See also Chiappori and Salanié (2000) for a broad
survey of empirical research on contract theory.
1investment on owned versus leased land. If landlords cannot credibly commit to long-term
contracts, then certain types of land speciﬁc investment will be underprovided by tenants,
whereas investment in owned land is obviously immune to holdup.
This is not the ﬁrst paper to compare farming practices on tenanted and owned land,
b u ti ti st h eﬁrst paper of its type to study investment behavior. Seminal work by Bell
( 1 9 7 7 ) ,f o l l o w e db yS h a b a n( 1 9 8 7 ) ,i sc o n c e r n e dw i t hs t a t i ce ﬃciency; i.e., with moral
hazard in current production eﬀort that can arise in share-tenancy. Our approach, by
contrast, is to examine the use of an input, farmyard manure, that enhances productivity
over more than one agricultural season. While manuring improves soil quality over an
extended period, it is an extremely labor intensive activity, one that, in rural Pakistan, is
virtually never entrusted to a hired worker. Thus, manuring is for all practical purposes
a non-contractible investment. Whether manure will be under-applied on tenanted land
relative to owned land depends on the extent to which landlords can commit to rewarding
the tenant for his investment. In a world of no commitment, tenants will apply manure
only to the point were the marginal return in the current period (i.e., the period of the
contract) equals the shadow price, and this dynamic ineﬃciency will be common to both
share tenants and ﬁx e dr e n tt e n a n t s ,e v e nt h o u g ht h el a t t e ra r ef u l lr e s i d u a lc l a i m a n t s .
Security of tenure does not appear to be entirely lacking in rural Pakistan. Despite
the absence of enforceable long-term contracts, annual tenancy contracts are typically
renewed. Consequently, tenants often stay with the same landlord for a number of years,
although the duration of tenancy is highly variable. Our evidence will show that a large
part of this tenure heterogeneity is generated by diﬀerences across landlords in retention
p o l i c i e s . T h i sf a c ta l l o w su st oa s kw h e t h e rd i ﬀerences in the degree of commitment lead
to diﬀerences in investment across tenants. If all tenants are equally insecure, then the
duration of tenancy would indicate nothing about a tenant’s incentive to invest. The
alternative hypothesis, against which we would like to test this null, is that the duration
of a tenancy is a signal of the degree of commitment in a relationship, albeit an imperfect
one. Longer durations should therefore be associated with greater investment.3
Our main econometric challenge lies in dealing with the endogeneity of tenurial arrange-
ments. Past work has stressed the importance of controlling for unobserved characteristics
of the tenant so as to avoid the problem of self-selection into diﬀerent contract types. Thus,
3Laﬀont and Mattousi (1995) ﬁnd that longer duration share contracts are associated with higher
farm output in Tunisia. However, because they do not examine investment directly, nor (crucially) allow
contract duration to aﬀect output of ﬁxed renters, one cannot use their results to distinguish the holdup
p r o b l e mf r o mm o r a lh a z a r di ne ﬀort. Their empirical approach also makes more restrictive assumptions
than ours in dealing with the endogeneity issues.
2for example, tenants may invest less than landowners merely because they are less wealthy.
The advantage of looking at land tenancy in India (Bell, 1977; Shaban, 1987)—and, as it
happens, in Pakistan—is that a given household will often cultivate two or more plots of
land under diﬀerent contractual arrangements, allowing a comparison of behaviors across
plots within the same household. A limitation of this approach is that it does not deal
with the possibility that the decision to lease out a plot (or to lease it out under a ﬁxed
rent versus a sharecropping contract) may depend on the unobserved attributes of the
plot, such as would be the case if there is adverse selection in the leasing market. We use
instrumental variables to address this potential endogeneity problem. Our identiﬁcation
argument, developed below, is that the assets of the owner of a given cultivated plot,
which our data set provides even if the plot is leased in, should determine the leasing
status of the plot but not its unobservable type.
The next section of the paper provides the context for our study and sets out a simple
two-period model of tenancy, moral hazard, and land-speciﬁc investment. Section 3
presents the estimation and identiﬁcation strategy as well as our evidence for a leasing
eﬀect on investment. The analysis of the tenure security eﬀect follows in section 4, along
with conclusions and implications in section 5.
2 Tenancy and Land Speciﬁc Investment
2.1 Data and context
Ownership of agricultural land is highly concentrated in rural Pakistan, where about half
the population is landless. As a result, land lease markets are quite active. According to
the latest agricultural census (2000), about a third of total cultivated area was tenant op-
erated, mostly (roughly two-thirds) under crop-sharing arrangements with the remainder
under ﬁxed rent. Land and tenancy reforms have been attempted at various times, but
they have been largely ineﬀectual, leaving tenant cultivators with little legal recourse in
the event of eviction.4 Land ownership, however, is clearly established in rural Pakistan
and the risk of expropriation by the state or by powerful individuals is negligible.
Our empirical analysis draws upon a new nationally representative rural household
survey. The Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS), which was completed in early 2002,
4Nabi (1986) reports data from a small 10 village survey in Pakistan’s Punjab in which 46 percent of
share-tenants said that their landlords could evict them ‘easily’ and 32 percent said that they or their
relatives had experienced eviction within the last two years. At the same time, however, most of these
tenants had been leasing land of the same landlord for more than 10 years.
3collected data from about 2,800 households sampled across 17 districts and 150 villages.
Roughly 60 percent of the households surveyed were farm households and a considerable
fraction of these operated multiple plots. The survey was designed to provide detailed
information at the plot level on land characteristics (soil type, irrigation, and so forth),
land tenure (including characteristics of tenants and owners and details of the contracts),
and production activities. These data were collected for the two main agricultural seasons,
kharif (May-November) and rabi (November-May). The main cash crops, cotton, rice,
and sugarcane, are grown in kharif, while the main food crop, wheat, is grown in rabi.
To provide evidence on the holdup problem, we want to focus on an activity that is,
in the ﬁrst place, at least partly an investment. Moreover, we would like this investment
to be relationship speciﬁc and noncontractible. Last, but not least, it must be relatively
easy to measure. Farmyard manure (FYM) meets all of these criteria.
FYM, composed largely of cattle dung, provides variable amounts of the three principal
soil nutrients, nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium. Equally, if not more, important than
its role as a nutrient source, FYM improves the quality of the soil by increasing aeration,
water retention, structure, and ability to retain nutrients (Government of Pakistan, 1997;
Gaur, 1992). Further, these beneﬁts of FYM are long-lasting.5 Extended ﬁeld trials in
India cited by Gaur (1992) show that the marginal eﬀects of FYM on grain yields persist
for at least three years following the initial application.6 Chemical fertilizers, meanwhile,
are used extensively in Pakistan, but they leach from the soil relatively quickly and hence
their productivity eﬀects are essentially limited to the season of application.
Because FYM, once applied and incorporated into the soil, is not portable, it is a
relationship speciﬁc investment in the purest sense. By contrast, investments like experi-
mentation with new farming techniques or seed varieties, which have an aspect of general
human capital, can be transferred, at least in part, to another landlord-tenant relationship.
S t i l l ,t h e r ea r eo t h e r ,l a r g e rs c a l e ,p u r e l ys p e c i ﬁc investments that farmers undertake in
rural Pakistan, such as constructing irrigation and drainage canals, clearing land, and
digging wells. However, these ﬁxed investments are, for the most part, contractible; the
tenant or some other party can be paid to do them for the landlord. It is, to be sure, an
interesting question as to whether contractible investment is underprovided on tenanted
land, but it is not one that speaks directly to the holdup problem.
5This feature of FYM has been exploited by Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002) in their study of the incentive
eﬀects of land expropriation in rural China. Besley (1995) also includes manuring among the investments
he examines.
6The marginal eﬀect of FYM in succeeding cropping seasons averaged 50-63% of the eﬀect in the inital
season over the three years of the experiments.
4The attraction of FYM, from our perspective, is that it is noncontractible. Farmers
rarely purchase FYM, but rather typically collect it as a by-product of their own livestock,
load it onto carts or donkeys, transport it to the plot and then spread and incorporate
it into the soil.7 This process is extremely labor intensive and thus costly to monitor.
The extent and quality of FYM application is also not easily veriﬁed or observed ex-post,
since weather and other sources of exogenous uncertainty make it diﬃcult to extract this
information from realized output alone.
Direct evidence on the noncontractibility of FYM application can be found in the farm
wage employment section of the PRHS, where agricultural jobs held over the past year are
enumerated by task. A miniscule 0.08 percent of all agricultural wage labor days fall under
the category ”collecting/spreading farmyard manure”.8 By way of comparison, about 7
percent of labor days are classiﬁed as ”weeding”, another seemingly hard to monitor task,
whereas two-thirds of all paid labor days in agriculture are devoted to harvesting various
crops. Harvesting work is more readily contractible because productivity per hour is
relatively easy to observe.9
Noncontractibility in itself does not preclude an eﬃcient level of investment. If the
landlord is able to commit fully to retaining the tenant for the duration of the investment,
a contract that makes the tenant the residual claimant to the returns on his investment
would induce optimal investment. The landlord could then simply remove any surplus
accruing to the tenant by appropriately increasing his rent. The classic holdup problem
arises only when the investment is noncontractible and the landlord is unable to commit.
The landlord stands to gain, in this case, by renegotiating the contract terms or contract
renewal ex-post. The tenant, aware of this potential for opportunism on the part of the
landlord, knows that he is unlikely to recoup all the fruits of his investment. It is thus
privately optimal for the tenant to underinvest. The remainder of this section sketches
out a simple model to formalize this intuition.
7Recommended quantities of FYM vary greatly by crop—at the high end, 10-15 cartloads (8000-12000
kg) for an acre of sugarcane, and even more for vegetables (Government of Pakistan, 1997).
8We do not have information from the survey that would allow us to compute the proportion of family
labor used for this task. However, data from northeast China, which has an agricultural technology not
disimilar from that of rural Pakistan, indicates that 8 percent of annual family farm labor goes into FYM
application (Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle, 2002).
9Indeed, according to the data, harvesting jobs are nearly twice as likely as weeding jobs to pay piece
rates, which rely on directly observing output or eﬀort.
52.2 Land speciﬁc investment under full commitment
To provide an organizing framework for our empirical work, we incorporate investment
into a standard limited liability model of land tenancy.10 While limited liability on the
part of the tenant is just one of several ways to obtain sharecropping as a possible optimal
contract (risk aversion, ex-ante ﬁnancial constraints, and double-sided moral hazard are
others), the implications for investment are similar across these tenancy models.
Each landlord owns a single unit of land that he cannot self-cultivate and therefore
must give over on lease to one out of a large population of tenants. The tenant is the sole
provider of two inputs that are unobservable to the landlord, current production eﬀort and
investment. Although our empirical work considers a recurrent investment, we strip the
model down to two periods. Investment, m ∈ [0,m], takes place only in the ﬁrst period,
but yields returns in both periods. Since these returns are embodied in the landlord’s
property, the investment is cooperative in the sense of Che and Hausch (1999). We
ignore discounting and depreciation; given our restrictions on the technology, the latter
assumption is innocuous. Eﬀort, e ∈ [0,e], is undertaken in both periods. The production
function f(e,m) is increasing and concave in its arguments. Output, Y = f(e,m)+ε,
depends on an additive shock ε with bounded support such that Y ∈ [0,Y ].T h e t e n a n t ’ s
cost functions c(e) and q(m) are increasing and convex in e and m.11
We take the landlord and tenant to be risk-neutral and consider linear contracts of
the form sY − r, where s is the output share of the tenant and r is his ﬁxed rental
payment, which can be negative. Tenants have an exogenously given opportunity cost
that determines their participation constraint and an exogenous pre-contract wealth that
determines their limited liability constraint (i.e., the maximum they can be made to pay
in any state of nature).
When the landlord can fully commit to a two period contract, the tenant’s optimality
conditions are
sfe(e,m)=ce(e) and 2sfm(e,m)=qm(m), (1)
the factor of 2 arising in the second equation from the fact that the tenant reaps a return
o nh i si n v e s t m e n ti nb o t hp e r i o d s . M e a n w h i l e ,t h eﬁrst-best — the eﬀort and investment
10Banerjee et al. (2002) also discuss this type of investment model. Other papers that have modelled
tenancy in a limited liability setting include Shetty (1988), Basu (1992), and Mookherjee (1997), to name
af e w .
11For technical convenience, these costs functions are also assumed separable from one another. Other-
wise, the model would have to be solved recursively starting from the second period.
6levels that maximize total surplus 2[E(Y | e,m) − c(e)] − q(m) —s o l v e s
fe(e,m)=ce(e) and 2fm(e,m)=qm(m). (2)
Clearly, the ﬁrst-best is achieved only when s =1 ; that is, when the lease is given on
ﬁxed rent. A landlord who can fully commit is essentially ‘selling’ the property rights on
land to the tenant for the duration of the contract. As residual claimant, the tenant is
fully incentivized and both moral hazard problems consequently disappear. However, it
can be shown that the landlord will only oﬀer a ﬁx e dr e n tc o n t r a c tt ot h o s et e n a n t sw i t h
suﬃciently high wealth. If the tenant cannot aﬀord the ﬁxed rent, then the landlord faces
a tradeoﬀ between production eﬃciency and surplus extraction; as a result, he may oﬀer
the tenant a share contract, s ∈ (0,1). Crop sharing gives rise to the familiar ‘Marshallian’
ineﬃciency, in which current production eﬀort and, in our model, investment are provided
below their ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l .
2.3 Tenure Insecurity and Investment
When the landlord can only commit to a one-period contract, the tenant’s optimality
conditions become
sfe(e,m)=ce(e) and sfm(e,m)=qm(m), (3)
so the marginal return on investment is half as large as in the full commitment case. This
is true regardless of whether the tenant is the residual claimant; a ﬁxed rent contract does
not eliminate the dynamic ineﬃciency. Under a share contract, however, the marginal
return on investment is even lower than under a ﬁxed rent contract. From these results
it easily follows that
Proposition 1 If investment is not itself contractible and the landlord cannot commit
to a tenancy contract that lasts at least as long as the duration of the investment, then the
tenant will undersupply land speciﬁc investment, even under a ﬁxed rent contract.
In practice, this holdup problem may be mitigated by reputational eﬀects. Speciﬁcally,
a landlord may be reluctant to milk his reputation by reneging on his tenant, realizing
that if he does so he will be ‘punished’ by never getting optimal investment on his land.
Of course, reputational equilibria are sensitive to a number of assumptions, such as the
extent of information costs, on which we need not dwell (see, e.g., Kreps, 1990). The point
7is that the existence of reputational heterogeneity provides us with an additional testable
implication. Returning to the model, assume that the tenant, knowing his landlord’s
reputation, believes his contract will be renewed in the second period with probability θ.
Full commitment can then be interpreted as the case where θ =1 , and no commitment
as the case where θ =0 .C l e a r l y , θ > 0 will increase investment relative to the no
commitment case. We thus have
Proposition 2 As the degree of tenure uncertainty increases, the tenant will reduce his
land speciﬁc investment.
There are other potential sources of heterogeneity in tenure security besides the re-
tention policies of landlords. Tenants may have diﬀerent search or moving costs or face
diﬀerent distributions of outside opportunities. In these cases, we may ﬁnd that some
tenants underinvest relative to others even if all landlords can fully commit to long term
contracts. It is, in eﬀect, the tenant here who cannot commit to staying long enough
to recoup his investment. However, in the environment that we study, heterogeneity in
turnover rates induced by tenant characteristics is unlikely to be of great importance. We
return to this issue in the next section.
3T h e L e a s i n g E ﬀect
3.1 Econometric speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation
Our test of Proposition 1 is based on a regression of per-acre FYM use, Mci,b y
cultivator c on plot i
Mci = αLci + β Xci + νc +εci, (4)
where Lci is an indicator of whether the plot is leased and Xci is a vector of exogenous plot
characteristics.12 The mean zero error term νc captures the eﬀects of unobserved factors
common to a given cultivator; e.g., prices, wealth, access to credit, risk aversion and the
discount rate, farming knowledge, average land quality, and, importantly, the household’s
available stock of FYM and other farm assets. The plot-speciﬁc error term εci reﬂects
12Shaban (1987) states the precise restrictions on technology necessary to move from the tenant’s ﬁrst-
order conditions under diﬀerent tenure types to a regression of input intensity on tenure type. We suppress
an analogous discussion here for the sake of brevity.
8measurement error in FYM use and, potentially, unobserved attributes of the plot.13
Most models of contractual choice in agriculture would imply that Lci depends on at
least one of the abovementioned factors captured by νc. To deal with this endogeneity
problem, we follow earlier work in the literature by restricting attention to owner-cum-
tenant (OCT) households. Suppose, for the sake of exposition, that we have a sample
consisting of two-plot households, one plot of which is leased in (Lci =1 )a n dt h eo t h e r
which is owned (Lcj =0 ). In this case, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimator and the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator, the one that we actually use in the empirical work, are numerically identical.
Diﬀerencing equation 4 across plots within a household, yields
∆Mc = αLci + β ∆Xc + ∆εc (5)
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator (note: ∆Lc = Lci). The OLS estimate of α from this
regression is consistent provided that E [Lci∆εc]=0 . N o t e ,t h ef a c tt h a to w n e r - c u m -
tenant households might be a selective sample (in the sense that E [νc|OCT]  =0 ) ,d o e s
not aﬀect the estimates of 5 because νc diﬀerences out of this equation.
Given a suﬃciently rich set of observed plot characteristics Xci, the identifying assump-
tion E [Lci∆εc]=0should hold to a reasonable approximation. However, plot quality or
fertility is not easy to assess in survey data. Unobserved plot fertility could be correlated
with leasing choice due to adverse selection in the leasing market. If a component of plot
fertility is private information to the landowner, then the landlord may have an incentive
to lease out, rather than cultivate, plots of a certain type.14 Endogeneity bias induced
by the presence of unobserved plot quality has not, to our knowledge, been addressed in
past work of this genre. Shaban (1987), for example, controlling for essentially the same
plot characteristics that we do (plot value, irrigation, and soil type), assumes that leasing
decisions are uncorrelated with plot-speciﬁc unobservables.15
13We eventually also include in the regression a dummy for whether the plot is leased in on ﬁxed rent
versus on share, but this does not introduce any new econometric issues at this stage.
14As i m i l a re ﬀect could arise even if plot fertility is not private information. Suppose that certain plots
are more sensitive to tenant abuse (e.g., soil degradation) than others. Landlords may be reluctant to
lease out their more sensitive plots (see Allen and Lueck, 1992, for a tenancy model along these lines).
If plot sensitivity is also correlated with FYM use, then we again have an endogeneity problem. All the
econometric issues that arise with adverse selection apply with equal force to this moral hazard problem.
15Besley’s (1995) study of property rights and land-speciﬁc investment in Ghana does use a household
ﬁxed eﬀects/instrumental variables estimator similar to ours, but the instruments are intended only to deal
with measurement error in land rights. He, therefore, also assumes that plot quality is fully captured by
a limited set of observable characteristics. Likewise, Pender and Fafchamps (2001), who use instrumental
variables to test for Marshallian ineﬃciency in Ethiopia, do not consider the implications of asymmetric
information in the leasing market.
9What is needed are instruments correlated with contractual choice, but uncorrelated
with unobserved attributes of the plot, and which also vary across plots within the same
household. Such variables are typically hard to come by in farm household surveys.
In our data set, though, tenant cultivators report the characteristics of their landlord,
including among other things his total landholdings. So, we have data on the plot owner’s
landholdings regardless of whether the plot is leased in or owner-cultivated. Since farmers
e n d o w e dw i t hr e l a t i v e l ym o r el a n dt e n dt ol e a s eo u tag r e a t e rp r o p o r t i o no fi t ,ag i v e np l o t
is more likely to be leased in if it belongs to a larger landowner. Our principal instrument
for ∆Lc = Lci in equation 5 is therefore ∆Ao = Aoi −Aoj = Aoi −Acj, where Aoi denotes
the total landholdings of the owner of plot i. For owner-cultivated plots (Lci =0 )this will
just be the landholdings of the cultivator himself (i.e. Aoj = Acj).16 Identiﬁcation also
requires that E [∆Ao∆εc]=0 .I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e d i ﬀerence in the total landholdings
of the owner-cum-tenant and the landlord of his leased plot should not be correlated with
diﬀerences in the unobserved attributes of the owner-cultivated and leased plots. We
show why this should be the case in the next subsection.
Using the same argument, additional instruments can be constructed from other assets
of the landowner (tubewells and tractors) as well as by allowing the impact of relative land
endowments on the leasing decision to vary by the landholdings of the tenant-cultivator
(interacting ∆Ao with the land endowment of the cultivator Ac).N o t e t h a t t h e direct
eﬀect of the cultivator’s landowership on his input use has already been removed from
equation 5 along with the ﬁxed eﬀect νc.
3.2 Adverse selection and landholdings
To reiterate, our identiﬁcation strategy requires zero correlation between the unob-
served quality of a plot and the landholdings of its owner, conditional on the household
ﬁxed eﬀect. Adverse selection per se is not a problem for us in this regard. If a plot’s
quality is private information to its owner, and some fraction of each landowner’s plots are
‘good’ and the rest ‘bad’ quality, then bad plots would be leased out and good plots self-
cultivated, as the latter could never command a rent commensurate with their productiv-
ity.17 While leased-in plots would thus be of lower average quality than owner-cultivated
16Note that, while landowner characteristics may be endogenous in the ﬁrst-stage contractual choice
regression due to landlord-tenant matching (as argued recently by Ackenberg and Botticini, 2002), a
correlation between instruments and error term in a ﬁrst-stage regression does not invalidate identiﬁcation
of the second stage regression parameters.
17Generalizing to a continuous distribution of quality, there will be a criticial quality level above which
the owner will not want to lease out the plot (see Wilson, 1980, for an exposition).
10plots, this quality diﬀerential would not depend on the diﬀerence in landholdings across
the plots’ owners; all leased plots would be of the same (bad) quality.
What could create an identiﬁcation problem is that the degree of adverse selection
in the leasing market might depend on the land endowment of the lessor. Suppose, in
particular, that there are diseconomies of scale in self-cultivation over the relevant range
of landholdings due, for example, to the cost of supervising hired labor. At the margin,
it may pay for a landowner to lease out some of his good plots in this case, even at the
disadvantageous market equilibrium rent. Since larger landowners would ﬁnd it necessary
to lease out a greater proportion of their good plots, there could be a positive correlation
between a plot’s quality and the landholdings of its owner.
The question, of course, is whether this argument is empirically relevant. We can
directly check this because we have data on the total area cultivated by each tenant’s
landlord. In the nearly 800 tenancies for which these data are complete, two-thirds of
the landlords cultivate no land at all and about 90 percent cultivate less than half of
their land. The average landlord cultivates 11 percent of his owned area, a ﬁgure that
rises to just 15 percent for ‘small’ landlords (owning less than 100 kanals = 12.5 acres).
Such uniformly limited landlord cultivation leaves little scope for variation in the degree
of adverse selection.
Nevertheless, if the degree of adverse selection does in fact vary systematically with
landholdings, then land rents must adjust in equilibrium; this is because a landlord’s
holdings are easily observed by potential tenants. Thus, as these tenants realize that
small landowners lease out worse land on average than large landowners, the rent that
they would be willing to pay to a small landowner for an observationally equivalent plot
must decline. Land rent should then be positively related to the landholdings of the
landlord, conditional on the information that the tenant has about the plot.18
Table 1 presents an analysis of land rent (i.e., log of cash + value of in-kind rent)
based on the 198 ﬁxed rent tenants in our sample with complete information. We control
for plot characteristics, including the value of the plot reported by the tenant,a sw e l l
as for village ﬁxed eﬀects to capture local leasing market conditions. Neither the log of
the landlord’s landholdings, in column (1), nor the small landowner dummy, in column
(2), are signiﬁcantly related to land rents. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the degree of
adverse selection in the leasing market varies with our key instruments. Which is not to
say that adverse selection is unimportant; we still need to correct for its possible inﬂuence
18The same argument would apply to the terms of sharecropping contracts, but empirically it is much
harder to measure the ‘rent’ accruing to the landlord in this case.
11in equation 5. But now we can proceed to our test of Proposition 1 conﬁdent of our
identifying assumptions.
3.3 Data preliminaries
Starting from the nearly 2400 plots on which there was at least some cultivation
during the 2000-01 agricultural year, we drop those of households cultivating a single plot.
As shown in Table 3, this leaves us with 1508 plots operated by 593 households for the
ﬁxed eﬀects analysis of FYM use. Of these plots, 474 are cultivated by 184 owner-cum-
tenant households; i.e., households with at least one owner-cultivated plot and one leased
plot. It is exclusively these plots that will identify any contracting eﬀect. Since we want
to control for a number of plot characteristics as well, we retain the remaining 1,034 plots
to maximize the eﬃciency of the estimates. The 337 leased plots in this subsample also
help in estimating the tenancy duration eﬀect.
Before proceeding, a point about our measure of FYM, which is in kilograms used
over the year per cultivated acre of the plot. Although all plots in our sample had some
cultivation during the year, parts of some plots were left fallow or in some cases a whole
plot was uncultivated during one season (usually for lack of irrigation water rather than
to rejuvenate the soil). In principle, farmers might apply FYM to fallow areas for the
beneﬁt of future crops, though, given that the highest return on manuring is realized in the
season of application, this strategy seems ineﬃcient. Nevertheless, to check whether such
behavior varies systematically by tenancy status, we experimented with FYM use scaled
by the total area of the plot, regardless of cultivation. Since the estimated leasing eﬀects
diﬀer only at the third decimal place across these two ways of deﬁning the dependent
variable, we just report the results based on FYM per cultivated acre in this paper.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 foreshadow some key results. Among the owner-
cum-tenant households, owned plots receive nearly twice as much FYM on average as
leased plots, and owned plots are considerably more likely to receive any FYM in the ﬁrst
place. Furthermore, there is no discernible diﬀerence in FYM use between sharecropped
plots and those leased in under a ﬁxed rental arrangement, although the use rate is some-
w h a tl o w e ro nr e n t e dp l o t s . W h i l et h e s eﬁndings are in line with the predictions of our
holdup model, it is premature to draw conclusions based on simple mean comparisons.
Two additional features of the data on FYM use emerge from Table 3, each with
implications for our estimation procedure. First, the data are heavily censored at zero;
almost two-thirds of plots receive no FYM (partly this is attributable to the carryover
12eﬀect, which may make it uneconomical to apply every year). Second, for those plots on
which FYM is applied, there is a great range of variation in the amount per acre. We
thus experimented with various transformations of the dependent variable. Among those
that can handle zero values, we found that a simple one, log(M + k), works reasonably
well in terms of ﬁtting the data. Unfortunately, in the presence of zeros, there is no way
to let k b eaf r e ep a r a m e t e ri nt h ee s t i m a t i o n ,s ot h ec h o i c eo fk is largely arbitrary (we
s e ti tt o0 . 1 ) . 19 In addition, the estimated coeﬃcients are not invariant to the choice
of k, which means that these coeﬃcients cannot be used to compute, say, the implied
percentage diﬀerential in FYM use on leased versus owned plots. Instead of making such
quantitative statements, our focus, for now at least, is on hypothesis testing. For this
purpose, the logarithmic transformation is perfectly adequate since the t-statistics are
essentially invariant to the choice of k.20
Our analysis controls for the following plot characteristics: area, location (inside/outside
village), access to year-round or seasonal canal irrigation, access to groundwater of varying
quality, topography, soil quality, and self-assessed plot value.21 Details of these variables,
means by tenancy status, and coeﬃcient estimates for a particular speciﬁcation are re-
ported in appendix Table A.1. Note that we do not have data on the exact distance
between the farmer’s house and the plot; we only know whether the plot is outside his
village or not. This could be a concern, given that both the cost of manure application
on a given plot and tenancy status might vary by distance to the homestead. However,
in our sample, 92% of all cultivated plots are located within the village (93% of owned
plots compared to 90% of leased plots). Given the size of most villages in Pakistan, the
vast majority of plots are therefore, at most, only a kilometer or two from the farmer’s
home.22 Within this radius, transport cost diﬀerentials are likely to be minimal. More-
19We choose k so that it is at least an order of magnitude less than the minimum value of the dependent
variable. Maximum likelihood estimation of k would fail, since the log Jacobian of the transformation
of y is −log(y + k).A t y =0 , the optimization algorithm would always try to set k as close to zero as
possible.
20For example, the t-value for the leasing coeﬃcient in row (3) of Table 4 is 5.91. The corresponding
t-value is 5.92 when k =0 .01 and 5.93 when k =0 .001, even though the associated coeﬃcients vary widely
in magnitude.
21Both owners and tenant cultivators are asked to report plot value in the survey. One might worry that
these values partly reﬂect the extent of past manuring, although this seems quite unlikely given that the
eﬀects of FYM are far from permanent. In any event, the exclusion of this variable from the regressions
has a negligible impact on the estimates of interest.
22We can be more precise by examining data from the 1991 IFPRI survey, which did collect information
on distance to plot (but not on whether the plot was outside the village). Virtually all of the households
in this survey were included in the 2001 PRHS sample as part of a panel. Among the 914 plots recorded
in the 1991 survey, mean distance between household and plot is only 600 meters (median 300 meters).
13over, when we exclude the 118 plots located outside the farmer’s village from our analysis,
the estimates do not change perceptibly, suggesting that the lack of distance information
for these plots is not driving our results.23
3.4 Main results: The leasing eﬀect
All the FYM speciﬁcations in Table 4 include household ﬁxed eﬀects. The leasing
coeﬃcient estimate from the basic model in row (1), which assumes that leasing choices are
uncorrelated with unobserved plot attributes, is negative and highly signiﬁcant (p-value
< 0.0000). Thus, less FYM per acre is used on a leased plot than on an owned plot with
the same observed characteristics and cultivated by the same household. This evidence
against full committment is not an artifact of the sample restrictions required by the
household ﬁxed eﬀects procedure, namely the exclusion of single-plot households. When
we estimate the corresponding household random eﬀects speciﬁcation on the full sample
of 2375 plots, and include an interaction term between the leasing dummy and a dummy
for multi-plot households, the coeﬃcient on this interaction term is insigniﬁcant (p-value
=0 .483). While the leasing coeﬃcient estimated from this random eﬀects speciﬁcation
m a yi t s e l fb eb i a s e d( b e c a u s eE [Lciνc]  =0in equation 4),24 unless the degree of this
bias diﬀers across the multi-plot and single-plot household samples, the interaction term
coeﬃcient is an unbiased estimate of the diﬀerence in leasing eﬀects across the two samples.
Returning to Table 4, we next use Honore’s (1992) ﬁxed eﬀect tobit estimator to assess
the ramiﬁcations of severe censoring of FYM use at zero. While this tobit estimator makes
limited distributional assumptions (e.g., it does not impose normality), it does not allow
us to treat leasing choices as endogenous conditional on the ﬁxed eﬀect. To get estimates
comparable to those in row (1) — i.e., marginal eﬀects — we multiply the ﬁxed eﬀect tobit
coeﬃcients and standard errors by one minus the observed censoring rate.25 The results in
row (2) of Table 4 show that ignoring corner solutions leads us to understate the evidence
against the null, but not by very much; the t-statistic on the leasing coeﬃcient rises from
Moreover, leased plots are, on average, 88 meters nearer to the farmer’s homestead than owned plots,
though this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
23Using the speciﬁcation in row (3) of Table 4 as a comparator, we obtain a t-value on the leasing
coeﬃcient of 6.10 instead of 5.91 when these 118 plots are excluded.
24It is, in fact, biased. The household random eﬀects estimate of the leasing coeﬃcient on the multi-plot
household sample is −1.50 (0.277), which (though still signiﬁcantly negative) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
its ﬁxed eﬀect counterpart in Table 4 (Wu-Hausman test p-value =0 .018). Note that the random eﬀects
speciﬁcations reported here also include a full set of village dummies.
25Strictly speaking, unless one imposes distributional assumptions, the ﬁxed eﬀect tobit does not yield
predicted marginal eﬀects.
145.78 in row (1) to 6.48 in row (2).26
The data also exhibit enormous variation in the size of farm plots, with the variance
of FYM per acre being much higher on the smaller plots. We therefore depart from
the homoskedasticity assumption by allowing var(εci)=σ2a
−η
ci , where aci is plot area
and η is estimated along with the other parameters (by maximum likelihood). The
results of reestimating speciﬁcation (1) with η free are reported in row (3). The leasing
coeﬃcient is basically unchanged, though the standard error is marginally lower. Even
though we can reject homoskedasticity (p-value =0 .0001) and the residual variance does,
as expected, decline with plot area (i.e., e η > 0), heteroskedasticity is not severe enough in
this logarithmic speciﬁcation to make much of a diﬀerence. Nonetheless, we continue to
leave η unrestricted for the remainder of our estimation.
Next we relax the assumption that the leasing decision is uncorrelated with unobserved
plot characteristics. As discussed earlier, such a correlation could arise if there is asym-
metric information in the leasing market leading either to adverse selection or to moral
hazard (see fn.14). Either way, the impact on our estimate of the leasing eﬀect depends
on whether leased plots are of high or low fertility on average and on how plot fertility
inﬂuences FYM use. For example, if low fertility plots tend to be leased out and low
fertility reduces the return to manuring, then there will be a negative correlation between
the leasing dummy and the error term, whereas this correlation will be positive if low
fertility plots have a higher return to manuring. In short, the endogeneity bias in the
leasing coeﬃcient could work in either direction.
In addition to the plot owner’s landholdings, our instrument set includes a dummy for
whether the owner is a small landowner (see Table 1), dummies for whether he owns a
tractor and a tubewell, and interactions of these four variables with each other as well as
with the total owned area of the plot cultivator. The joint explanatory power of these
12 instruments, conditional on the household ﬁxed eﬀects and the plot characteristics, is
high (F(12,891) = 89.6); they also easily pass the overidentiﬁcation test (see Table 4).27
Comparing rows (3) and (4) of Table 4 shows the negligible eﬀect of instrumenting
on the the leasing coeﬃcient and, above all, that the IV estimate remains signiﬁcantly
negative. The Wu-Hausman exogeneity test has a p-value of only 0.507, an especially
26While most of the variation in FYM use is at the extensive margin, there is also considerable infor-
mation in the quantity data conditional on use. The estimated leasing coeﬃcient from a ﬁxed eﬀect logit
model based on the use/not use decision alone has a t-value of 5.08. However, if we reestimate speciﬁcation
(1) dropping all cases of zero FYM use, we still obtain a t-value on the leasing eﬀect of 3.14.
27To be conservative, throughout this paper we use the heteroskedasticity robust version of the overi-
dentiﬁcation test (see Wooldridge, 1995).
15compelling result given the high power of the test.28 Failure to reject exogeneity of
the leasing choice suggests either that asymmetric information in the leasing market is
unimportant or that unobserved plot attributes do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the returns to
FYM use. As we will see, this ﬁnding also has implications for our interpretation of the
eﬀect of tenancy duration.29
4 The Tenure Security Eﬀect
4.1 Econometric considerations
To test Proposition 2, we relax the restriction in equation 5 that the impact of leasing
on investment is the same for all tenants (i.e., a common α).T h u s , l e t µoc be a latent
variable representing the degree of tenure security, the dual subscripts indicating that this
variable is speciﬁc to an owner (landlord)-cultivator (tenant) match. In terms of the
model in section 2.3, we may think of µ as the objective probability of contract renewal,
in contrast to the subjective (on the part of tenant) probability θ;i no t h e rw o r d s ,θ is the
tenant’s prior on µ.F o r µ to matter for investment behavior, the tenant’s prior must be
informative to some extent.
For owner-cultivated plots, on which tenure security is presumably absolute and un-
varying, we set µoc = µcc =1without loss of generality. We also make the innocuous
normalization E [µoc|Lci =1 ]=0 , from which it follows that E [µocLci]=0 .A u g m e n t i n g
equation 5 gives
∆Mc = αLci + γLci ×µoc + β ∆Xc + ∆εc. (6)
Our null hypothesis is that γ =0 ; i.e., tenure security does not inﬂuence the tenant’s
investment on his leased plot vis a vis his owned plot. The alternative hypothesis is that
investment incentives are stronger in more secure tenancies, so that γ > 0.
28In particular, based on an inverse power function calculation (Andrews, 1989), we can be 95% certain
that we would have rejected exogeneity if the true leasing coeﬃcient was less than 0.96 in absolute value
(instead of 1.95). Notice that, even if the leasing coeﬃcient were this small, we would still have been able
to reject the null that it is zero.
29Since recommended amounts of FYM vary greatly by crop, it is also worth asking how much of the
leasing eﬀect is due to diﬀerences in the crops grown on tenanted versus owner-cultivated plots. Controlling
in speciﬁcation (3) for the proportion of cultivated plot area devoted to the eight most important crops
(wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, maize, rabi fodder, sorghum fodder, and vegetables) only reduces the
leasing eﬀect to -1.65 (0.352), which suggests that tenants respond to the investment disincentive mainly
by using FYM less intensively on every crop.
16The test requires information on µoc, which is not directly observed. But notice that
the ongoing duration of a tenancy, doc, is a (noisy) indicator of the underlying insecurity
of tenure. In Jovanovic’s (1979) job-matching model, for example, the hazard rate of job
separation in the presence of speciﬁc investment is a function of elapsed job duration and of
m a t c hq u a l i t y . I fw o r k e r s( t e n a n t s )h a v ed i ﬀerent costs of search and ﬁrms (landlords) have
diﬀerent retention policies, then the separation hazard also depends on these additional
exogenous sources of turnover. Since the hazard rate (which is one minus the contract
renewal probability) uniquely deﬁnes the distribution of tenancy duration, we may write
log(doc)=E [log(doc)|µoc]+ξoc,w h e r eξoc is random ‘luck’. Taking a linear approximation
to the conditional expectation delivers
log(doc)=µoc + ξoc, (7)
which is exact if elapsed duration is distributed as a Weibull. Equation 7 suggests putting
(demeaned) log duration interacted with the dummy variable Lci into equation 6 as a proxy
for Lci×µoc. It also implies that doing so leads to an errors-in-variables problem, because
of ξoc. Since the resulting estimate of γ is biased toward zero, we will tend to ﬁnd weaker
evidence against the null (that γ =0 )t h a ni fw eo b s e r v e dµoc directly. Of course, this is
a moot point if we actually end up rejecting the null.30
Tenancy duration may also be endogenous in equation 6 for reasons other than mea-
surement error, as we discuss in detail in subsection 4.3.
4.2 Evidence from landlords
F o ro u rt e s to ft h et e n u r es e c u r i t ye ﬀect to have power, there must be a reasonable
amount of variation in tenancy duration. But variation in doc does not necessarily imply
variation in µoc,o ri nθ for that matter. To see why, take the case where θ,t h es u b j e c t i v e
probability of retention, does not vary across tenants. Since actual contract renewal is a
stochastic process, we would still observe a nondegenerate distribution of elapsed tenancy
durations, but no relationship between duration and investment. It is thus important
to assess the extent to which variation in tenancy duration reﬂects heterogeneity in the
objective factors underlying µoc, like tenant mobility and landlord behavior.31
To do so, we use data collected from the landlords in our sample. For each plot that
30Note that, since E [µocLci]=0 , the estimate of α is robust to measurement error in µoc.
31Match quality, which by deﬁnition is not speciﬁc to the landlord or to the tenant, cannot be distin-
guished from the error term ξoc.
17was leased out, the survey asks its owner about the characteristics of the tenant, including
his principal assets, and about the duration of the tenancy. For reasons that will become
apparent shortly, we focus only on those landlords who report at least two leased plots,
which gives us a sample of 345 tenanted plots owned by 127 landlords in 52 villages. The
median elapsed tenure in this sample is 4 years and the mean is 6 years.
Column (1) of Table 2 reports a regression of log duration on an array of tenant, land-
lord, and plot characteristics, and on geographical dummies for each of the 18 tehsils (ad-
ministrative units below a district). Less than a third of the total variance in log(duration)
is explained by these covariates. Tenants with larger land holdings appear to be less mo-
bile, staying with a given landlord longer. But tenants’ ownership of a tractor or plow
has no eﬀect on duration, nor do any of the landlord asset variables.
The regression in the second column of Table 2 includes landlord ﬁxed eﬀects. All
the landlord characteristics and tehsil dummies consequently drop out. Remarkably, this
regression explains 80 percent of the variance in log duration. This means that a landlord-
speciﬁc unobservable, which is uncorrelated with landlord assets, accounts for at least half
of the variation in tenancy durations in our sample.32
Evidently, a large portion of the variation in µoc consists of heterogeneity in the be-
havior of landlords toward all their tenants taken as a group. One interpretation of this
heterogeneity is that there are those who can acquire reputations as ‘good’ landlords who
do not opportunistically evict their tenants and others who cannot. If so, then not only
can we use duration data to test proposition 2, but we can interpret any tenure security
eﬀect as arising largely from landlord commitment problems.
4.3 Main results: The tenure security eﬀect
Among the 563 tenanted plots in our sample, the median number of years that the
same tenant has cultivated the plot is 7; 8 years for share-tenants and 4 years for ﬁxed-
rent tenants. Results reported in rows (5) and (6) of Table 4 strongly support a tenure
security eﬀect. The negative impact of leasing on FYM use declines signiﬁcantly with
tenure on the plot, whether leasing itself is treated as exogenous (p-value =0 .0015)o ra s
32Note, however, that part of the landlord ﬁxed eﬀect includes landlord means of unobserved plot and
tenant characteristics. Since these unobservables are likely to have high intra-village correlation, we also
compared the ﬁto far e g r e s s i o nw i t hvillage ﬁxed eﬀects to that of one with landlord ﬁxed eﬀects on a
sample of 263 plots (95 landlords in 20 villages) for which there were at least two landlords per village.
The R
2’s are, respectively, 0.351 and 0.784. This suggests that unobserved plot and tenant characteristics
that vary across villages account for very little of the landlord eﬀect.
18endogenous (p-value =0 .0019). More durable relationships between landlord and tenant,
which the evidence in section 4.2 suggests are associated with ‘better’ landlords, yield
greater investment. So, we do not seem to be in a world of no commitment.
A possible alternative explanation for this result, however, is that tenants stay longer
on plots of higher quality, and on these plots the return to FYM use also happens to
be higher. Why would tenants stay longer on better plots?33 Consider the adverse
selection model again, but with a continuum of unobservable (to the tenant) plot quality.
Initially, the tenant does not know whether he has leased in a particularly good or bad
plot, although he may know the average quality of leased plots. Presumably, the longer
the tenant cultivates the land the more he learns about its underlying fertility. Assume,
further, that landlords cannot commit to more than one-year contracts. Thus, after the
ﬁrst year of tenancy, the landlord and tenant renegotiate. Suppose that the landlord
oﬀers the tenant the same rent as in the previous year. The tenant will only stay on
for a second year if his posterior estimate of plot quality is at least as high as his prior
(assuming zero cost of changing landlords). Therefore, holding rent constant,t e n a n t sw i l l
remain longer on better plots. Of course, there is no reason to suppose that the landlord
will oﬀer the same rent, since he knows that the tenant has learned something about the
plot’s quality. If the landlord has a relatively good plot, then he would want to raise
the rent, but not to the point where the incumbent tenant would leave. This ‘informed’
tenant is more valuable to him than an uninformed tenant and needs to be given some
incentive to stay on. The opposite is true for a landlord with a below average quality
plot; he would want to replace the incumbent tenant with an ignorant one. In sum, the
model implies: (1) Tenants remain longer on better plots; and (2) Rent rises with tenure.
Our earlier evidence already belies the empirical relevance of this story. Failure to
ﬁnd negative endogeneity bias in the leasing coeﬃcient (recall Table 4, row (4)), despite
powerful instruments, suggests that the necessary conditions — asymmetric information in
the land leasing market and returns to FYM use that increase in unobserved plot fertility
—a r en o tjointly present in rural Pakistan. Therefore, tenancy duration should not be
acting as a proxy for unobserved plot quality in the FYM regressions.
Nevertheless, to deal with the issue directly, we now instrument tenancy duration.
Because landlord assets explain little of the observed variation in duration (see Table 2),
33Clearly, any plot attribute that is observable to both landlord and tenant prior to contracting should
not aﬀect length of tenure. This is indeed borne out in the data. When we run a regression analogous
to speciﬁcation (1) of Table 2, but using the log duration and other variables reported from the tenant’s
rather than landlord’s side, and based on the full sample of tenants (N =9 5 4 ), plot value, canal irrigation,
tubewell irrigation, plot topography, and soil type are not jointly signiﬁcant (results available upon request).
19we augment our original instrument set with the leave-out mean of log duration within the
village.34 Average duration in a village should be correlated with plot-speciﬁcd u r a t i o n
to the extent that the duration of tenancies are determined by village leasing market con-
ditions. Moreover, village-average duration should not be correlated with the unobserved
(to the tenant) quality of a given plot; in particular, any plot quality information reﬂected
in village-average duration should be common knowledge in the village. Row (7) of Table
4 reports IV estimates that treat both leasing and tenancy duration as endogenous. Com-
pared to row (6), there is no evidence of upward bias; if anything, the reverse seems to be
the case, as would be consistent with the measurement error story in subsection 4.1.
We can also check whether implication (2) passes empirical muster using the per acre
land rent regression in Table 1. When we introduce the log of tenancy duration into this
regression, it attracts a negative but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient (column (3)). Thus, there is
no evidence that rents are increasing in tenancy duration conditional on the observable
characteristics of the plot (and village ﬁxed eﬀects). Using instead a dummy for tenure
longer than 3 years (two-thirds of ﬁxed rent tenancies in our sample have lasted at least
four years), we again ﬁnd, in column (4), no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in rent per acre paid by
short and long duration tenants. These ﬁndings, and additional evidence to be presented
later, suggest that tenancy duration does not, to a signiﬁcant degree, reﬂect an incumbent
tenant’s informational advantage regarding plot quality.
4.4 Fixed rent versus share contracts
As we have emphasized, the potential for holdup is present regardless of whether the
tenant has taken the land on ﬁxed rent or on a share contract. Although the ﬁxed rent
tenant, unlike the sharecropper, is full residual claimant, as long as he cannot be assured
o ft h ef u l lr e t u r no nh i sl a n d - s p e c i ﬁc investment, he will also invest less than a plot owner.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcations in Table 4 include a dummy for whether the plot is leased on a
ﬁxed rent basis. The coeﬃcient on this dummy captures the eﬀect of ﬁx e dr e n t a lo nF Y M
use over and above the average leasing eﬀect. Thus, if holdup is an issue, we expect the
sum of the leasing and ﬁxed rent coeﬃcients to be signiﬁcantly less than zero. Further,
as we have seen, theory predicts that the ﬁxed rent coeﬃcient will be positive; ﬁxed rent
tenants would provide the ﬁr s t - b e s tl e v e lo fm a n u r i n gi naw o r l do ff u l lc o m m i t m e n t ,
but, regardless of the degree of commitment, share-tenants would always underprovide
34We also add the six instruments to be discussed in the next subsection. Village mean duration must
be interacted with these 18 instruments in order to contribute to the estimation of the household ﬁxed
eﬀects model.
20this investment because of moral hazard (the tenant’s output share is no greater than 50
percent in the vast majority of our cases).
To help explain the decision to take a plot on ﬁxed rent versus on share, and thus
to improve the precision of our IV estimates, we add 6 instruments to our earlier set
of 12 (speciﬁcally, interactions between two of the plot owner asset variables and three
village-level variables: proportion of land sharecropped, proportion of land rented, and
gini coeﬃcient for landownership).35 But even this augmented instrument set does not
explain the ﬁxed rent decision very well, relatively speaking; the F-statistic for the ex-
cluded instruments in the ﬁxed rent equation is only 27.3, compared to 60.6 in the leasing
equation. Nevertheless, whether we use instruments (row (9)) or not (row (8)), we can
reject with near certainty the hypothesis that plots leased on ﬁxed rent receive the same
amount of investment as owned plots ( p-value =0 .0002 in row (9); < 0.0000 in row (8)).
Far less certain is the comparison between ﬁxed renters and share tenants. The unin-
strumented results in row (8) suggest that rented plots actually receive less FYM than
sharecropped plots (p-value =0 .022). After instrumenting, the ﬁxed rent coeﬃcient is
practically unchanged but becomes insigniﬁcant. If we ignore the endogeneity of leas-
ing decisions (as seems justiﬁed), and return to the ﬁxed eﬀect tobit estimator discussed
earlier, we obtain the results reported in row (10). Here we again ﬁnd a negative but
insigniﬁcant ﬁxed rent eﬀect (p-value =0 .303).
The curious ﬁnding that share-tenants do not invest any less than ﬁxed rent tenants,
conditional on tenancy duration, might be explained by a monitoring argument. Given
moral hazard in current production eﬀort, it may pay for a landlord to be involved in and
to supervise his share-tenant’s production activities. Indeed, share-tenants in Pakistan are
typically heavily supervised (see Nabi, 1986; Jacoby and Mansuri, 2004), either directly
b yt h e i rl a n d l o r do rb yh i r e dl a b o rm a n a g e r s( kamdars). If there are economies of scope
in supervision, then the cost of monitoring a tenant’s investment eﬀort (at least to some
degree) is lower in sharecropping than in ﬁxed rental arrangements. Provided that this
monitoring eﬀect outweighs the moral hazard eﬀect, share tenants may invest more than
ﬁxed rent tenants, although an econometric investigation of this hypothesis is beyond
the purview of the present paper. Our main result here is that tenants of either type,
unequivocally, invest less than owners.
35The ﬁrst two of these village level variables are computed directly from the full survey sample, whereas
the land gini is based on a census of landownership for the entire population of each village. Since these
6n e wi n s t r u m e n t sh a r d l ya d da n ye x p l a n a t o r yp o w e rt ot h eﬁrst-stage regression for the overall leasing
decision, we did not use them in earlier IV speciﬁcations.
21Importantly, the coexistence of ﬁxed rent and share tenancy contracts in rural Pakistan
allows us to address a lingering concern about the tenure security eﬀect, which is that it
might be an artifact of tenant eviction upon failing to meet an output standard. If
landlords use eviction as a threat to elicit higher eﬀort (see, e.g., Banerjee, et al., 2002)
or as a way to weed out bad tenants, then longer duration tenants may be precisely those
who tend to shirk less. Longer term tenants may then use more FYM merely because it
i sac o m p l e m e n tt ot h e i r( g r e a t e r )e ﬀort in production.
But this eviction story applies only to share-tenants, as ﬁxed-rent contracts are not
contingent upon observed output. Thus, if the tenure security eﬀect in Table 4 arises solely
from punitive eviction, it must be due to variation in the duration of share-tenancies alone.
In other words, allowing the coeﬃcient on log duration to diﬀer by type of tenancy should
result in a coeﬃcient of zero for ﬁx e dr e n tt e n a n t s . W h a tw eﬁnd is just the opposite.
Estimating an unconstrained version of speciﬁc a t i o n( 8 )i nT a b l e4l e a d st oal o gd u r a t i o n
coeﬃcient of 0.508 (0.253) for share-tenants and 0.837 (0.416) for ﬁxed-rent tenants, both
of which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but not from each other (p-value =0 .494).
T h es a m em o d i ﬁcation of the ﬁxed eﬀect tobit speciﬁcation (10) yields similar conclusions
(the corresponding estimates are 1.056 (0.329) and 1.529 (0.644), p-value =0 .468). So, it
does not appear that the positive relationship between FYM use and tenancy duration is
being driven by landlords using eviction as a sharecropper discipline or screening device.
4.5 Further tests
Our ﬁnal set of tests concerns the consequences of landlord-tenant matching. One
might object to our evidence for a tenure security eﬀect on the grounds that whatever
it is that ties the tenant to his landlord could inﬂuence not only his FYM use, but his
other input decisions as well. In Jovanovic’s (1979) model, for example, heterogeneity
in match quality determines both job duration and productivity. Long-lived tenant-
landlord matches may be more productive in the sense that the marginal products of a
whole range of inputs may be higher than those of short duration tenancies. In this case,
long duration tenancies may be associated with more intensive use of FYM and of other
inputs even in the absence of committment problems. Unobserved plot quality, discussed
in subsection 4.3, is a special case, implying, as we have seen, that tenants stay longer (and
perhaps use more FYM) on more productive plots. Unlike the case of eviction, though,
this positive tenure-productivity eﬀect applies with equal force to sharecropping and ﬁxed
rental arrangements and is therefore consistent with the ﬁndings in the last subsection.
22To assess the relevance of the matching argument, we examine chemical fertilizers.
Since these fertilizers have negligible carryover across seasons, their use should not be
directly aﬀected by investment incentives and consequently by variation in tenure security.
A positive relationship between tenancy duration and chemical fertilizer use would thus
be consistent with a match duration-productivity link, casting doubt on our interpretation
of the analogous ﬁn d i n gf o rF Y Mu s ea sat e n u r es e c u r i t ye ﬀect.36
The two most important chemical fertilizers in Pakistan are nitrogen and phosphate.
As shown in Table 3, both of these chemicals are applied to more plots in a given year
than is FYM, but mean quantities per acre hardly diﬀer across owned and leased plots.
Our econometric approach is essentially the same as in Table 4. Since we ﬁnd no evidence
of heteroskedasticity (i.e., e η is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) for both nitrogen and
phosphate, we impose the restriction η =0throughout. Also, for the IV estimation,
using the same 18 instruments as in Table 4, we reject the overidentifying restrictions for
both fertilizers. To get instruments that pass this test, we drop 8 of the interaction terms
from the original set, which gives us, in the case of nitrogen, speciﬁcation (3) of Table
5. In the case of phosphate, no subset of the original instruments manages to pass the
overidentiﬁcation test, so we do not report any IV results for this fertilizer.
Not a single coeﬃcient associated with the form of tenancy or its duration is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in Table 5; this includes the speciﬁcations that deal with censoring
of chemical fertilizer use at zero (rows (2) and (5)) and with the endogeneity of leasing
choices (row (3)). Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that owned, rented, and share-
cropped plots all receive the same amount of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer per acre.
This ﬁnding is not surprising given that, in most cases, fertilizer costs are shared between
landlord and share-tenant at the same rate as is output and, hence, there is no direct
Marshallian ineﬃciency (Shaban, 1987, obtains similar results for fertilizer use).37 For
our purposes, the major ﬁnding is that there is no signiﬁcant association between tenancy
duration and the use of chemical fertilizers. As argued, this evidence lends credence to
t h et e n u r es e c u r i t yi n t e r p r e t a t i o ni nt h ec a s eo fF Y M ,s i n c et h ed e g r e eo ft e n u r es e c u r i t y
36There is, however, a potential indirect eﬀect of tenancy duration on chemical fertilizer use. If chemical
fertilizer and FYM are complements (substitutes) in production, then chemical fertilizers would be used
more (less) intensively on owned plots and on leased plots with a high degree of tenure security. Given
that FYM enhances the eﬃcacy of chemical fertilizers, it is not clear whether these two inputs are, on
balance, substitutes or complements. In any case, this indirect eﬀect is unlikely to be very large.
37Allen and Lueck (1992) point out that leasers, especially those on ﬁxed rent, may have an incentive to
overapply chemical fertilizers relative to owners because they do not fully internalize the long-term damage
to soil. Evidently, this eﬀect is not important in Pakistan, perhaps because use of chemical fertilizers, at
least across the range of variation seen in our data, is still relatively low by international standards.
23should have no direct eﬀect on a static input like chemical fertilizer.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Although committment and holdup problems lie at the core of incomplete contract
theory, their quantitative signiﬁcance has rarely been assessed directly. This paper ﬁnds
striking evidence of a holdup threat in a setting where theory suggests it should be preva-
lent, namely where investment is cooperative (in our case, the tenant’s investment beneﬁts
the landlord). In rural Pakistan, speciﬁc investment is lower on leased land than on owned
land cultivated by the same household, even after accounting for the potentially confound-
ing eﬀects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Further corroboration is found
i nt h ef a c tt h a tl a n dt a k e no nﬁxed rent receives as little, if not less, investment than land
taken on a share basis, a result that is inconsistent with an explanation based on static
moral hazard.
We also ﬁnd, after ruling out numerous alternative interpretations of the evidence, that
security of tenure, and hence the incentive to invest, varies considerably across tenancies.
This means that the mere potential for holdup does not necessarily lead to an unravelling
of all investment. What is the mechanism for restraining ex-post opportunism? Our
data show important diﬀerences across landlords in their propensity to retain their tenants,
suggesting that some landlords might value reputation more than others. One can imagine
an equilibrium in which ‘good’ landlords, who can credibly commit to not appropriate their
tenants’ investment returns, coexist with ‘bad’ landlords on whose land tenants never
invest. From the policy perspective, the ﬁnding that the degree of commitment varies
across tenancies means that there is scope for eﬀective tenancy reform. Put diﬀerently,
if tenure insecurity arises merely from inherent diﬀerences in tenant mobility, not from
landlord behavior, then legislation binding landlords to long term contracts would do little
to encourage investment.
Finally, it is worth asking about the economic signiﬁcance of underinvestment on ten-
anted land. Of course, the full extent of the dynamic ineﬃciency cannot be assessed
without accounting for all the diﬀerent types of land-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t . T h i sp a p e r
focuses on just a single investment, albeit an important noncontractible one, the use of
farmyard manure. Nevertheless, it is still instructive to ask, based on our estimates, how
yields would be aﬀected by giving land ownership rights to tenants. Fortunately, we have
access to results from a large number of agricultural experiments in India compiled by
24Gaur (1992) showing the eﬀect of FYM use on the yields of major crops;38 these should
also be approximately valid for neighboring Pakistan. In the year of application, one met-
ric ton of FYM per acre would increase the yields of any of the four major crops (wheat,
rice, cotton, and sugarcane) by 1.5-1.75 percent. Based on the leasing coeﬃcient from
a linear model otherwise identical to speciﬁcation (3) in Table 4, leased plots received
on average about 0.6 metric tons less FYM per acre than owned plots in the 2000-01
agricultural year. Therefore, by converting a leased plot into an owned plot, major crop
yields would rise by about one percent in the ﬁrst year. Taking into account the carryover
eﬀects of FYM to future years (see fn. 6) would give a cumulative yield gain of around
2-2.5 percent. For poor tenant households in rural Pakistan, even modest gains such as
t h e s ew i l lh a v ei m p o r t a n ti n c o m ee ﬀects.
To be sure, these are just gross impacts; they do not account for the cost of FYM
application, but they do give some sense of the magnitudes involved. Banerjee et al.
(2002) ﬁnd that a tenancy reform in India, one that fell far short of giving share-tenants
full ownership rights, increased crop yields on the order of 50-60 percent. At least part of
this increase, they argue, can be attributed to higher investment due to improved tenure
security. Our ﬁndings suggest that investment — more precisely, noncontractible invest-
ment — may only be a small part of the story. However, we reiterate, this conclusion rests
critically on what other noncontractible investments (e.g., land maintenance activities)
tenants can potentially undertake and how responsive these investments are to changes
in the security of tenure. Filling in these gaps in our knowledge is an important area for
future research.
38These estimates are more accurate than could ever be obtained from economic data because they are
quite literally taken from experiments, in which everything else is held constant. The experimental eﬀects
reported are for FYM use on top of a standard application of chemical fertilizer.
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28Table 1: Determinants of Land Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(landlord’s landholdings) -0.022 — — —
(0.048)
Landlord is small landowner (<12.5 acres) — -0.082 — —
(0.159)
Log(duration of tenancy) — — -0.137 —
(0.083)
Tenancy duration > 3 years — — — -0.125
(0.154)
Log(plot value per acre) 0.247* 0.249* 0.229* 0.232*
(0.104) (0.103) (0.095) (0.100)
Village dummies: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.712 0.712 0.721 0.714
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for household-level clustering in parentheses (* denotes p-value
< 0.05). The dependent variable is the log of rent (cash + value of in-kind) per acre. Each
regression also include the plot characteristics described in Table A.1 (except plot area) and
dummies for whether plot is cultivated in kharif or rabi season only. N=198 plots in 64 villages.
29Table 2: Determinants of the Duration of Tenancy
Mean (std. dev.) (1) (2)
Tenant characteristics:
Age 44.9 0.0038 0.0020
(11.5) (0.0069) (0.0053)
Landholdings (acres) 2.62 0.0190* 0.0347*
(10.4) (0.0054) (0.0160)
Own a tractor/plow 0.22 0.030 0.088
(0.201) (0.191)
Landlord characteristics:
Landholdings (acres) 18.9 0.0045 —
(34.9) (0.0058)
Own a tractor 0.081 -0.122 —
(0.367)
Own a tubewell 0.087 -0.173 —
(0.258)
Landlord related to tenant 0.084 0.141 0.666
(0.247) (0.432)
Landlord and tenant in 0.261 -0.410* -0.782*
same caste or clan (0.186) (0.199)
Plot characteristics: p-value 0.0040 0.1824
Landlord ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes
R2 0.308 0.804
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering on landlord in column (1)
(* denotes p-value< 0.05). The dependent variable is the log of tenancy duration.
All speciﬁcations include plot characteristics as described in Table A.1. Column (1)
also includes tehsil dummies. N= 345 plots (127 landlords).
30Table 3: Samples and Descriptive Statistics on Input Use
Sample N FYM Nitrogen Phosphate
Plots of multi- 1508 1173 38.7 15.8
plot households (3048) (35.6) (20.6)
[36.7] [85.5] [67.6]
Plots of owner- 474 1069 42.6 16.7
cum-tenants (2721) (38.5) (20.5)
[37.1] [87.9] [73.0]
Of these plots:
Owned 248 1388 43.1 17.1
(3083) (39.8) (23.0)
[46.2] [87.3] [71.8]
Leased 226 714 41.9 16.4
(2204) (37.1) (17.4)
[26.7] [88.5] [74.3]
Of these plots:
Sharecropped 127 702 32.7 12.9
(2425) (32.0) (15.2)
[29.9] [83.5] [67.7]
Fixed rental 99 730 53.7 20.7
(1895) (39.8) (19.1)
[23.2] [95.0] [82.8]
Notes: Mean (std. dev.) [% nonzero]. All quantities in kilogram
per cultivated acre.
31Table 4: Household Fixed Eﬀects Estimates of Plot-Level FYM Use
Leased on Leased × Overidentiﬁcation
Leased ﬁxed rent log(duration) η test (p-value)
(1) -1.98* —— 0 —
(0.342) —
(2)a -2.47* —— — —
(0.381)
(3) -1.95* — — 0.152* —
(0.329) (0.040)
(4)b -2.15* — — 0.152* 0.556
(0.446) (0.040)
(5) -1.76* —0 . 6 8 4 * 0.153* —
(0.333) (0.216) (0.040)
(6)b -1.91* —0 . 6 8 7 * 0.153* 0.573
(0.426) (0.221) (0.039)
(7)c -1.68* —0 . 9 1 1 * 0.149* 0.261
(0.352) (0.453) (0.040)
(8) -1.15* -1.35* 0.595* 0.159* —
(0.426) (0.587) (0.219) (0.039)
(9)b -1.41* -1.29 0.592* 0.160* 0.208
(0.620) (1.06) (0.232) (0.039)
(10)a -1.84* -0.844 1.15* ——
(0.579) (0.819) (0.287)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* denotes p-value< 0.05). The dependent variable is
log(kg FYM per acre + 0.1). All speciﬁcations include 12 plot characteristics (see Table A.1).
aFixed eﬀect tobit with quadratic loss function. Coeﬃcient and s.e. multiplied by 1 - censoring rate.
bIV estimates (leasing decisions endogenous).
cIV estimates (leasing decisions and tenancy duration endogenous).
32Table 5: Household Fixed Eﬀects Estimates of Plot-Level Chemical Fertilizer Use
Leased ×
Leased Leased on ﬁxed rent log(duration)
Nitrogen
(1) -0.340 -0.038 -0.029
(0.311) (0.430 (0.156)
(2)a -0.487 -0.080 -0.039
(0.327) (0.468) (0.191)
(3)b -0.765 0.332 -0.067
(0.479) (0.927) (0.170)
Phosphate
(4) 0.187 -0.516 0.181
(0.400) (0.553) (0.200)
(5)a 0.104 -0.528 0.185
(0.484) (0.524) (0.205)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* denotes p-value< 0.05). The dependent variable is
log(kg fertilizer per acre + 0.01). All speciﬁcations include 12 plot characteristics (see Table A.1).
aFixed eﬀect tobit with quadratic loss function. Coeﬃcient and s.e. multiplied by 1 - censoring rate.
bIV estimates. Sig. test of excluded IVs in ﬁrst-stage leasing equation, F(10,895) = 87.5,
for leasing on ﬁxed rent, F(10,895) = 27.2. Overidentiﬁcation test p-value =0 .299.
33Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics and Results for Plot Characteristics
Means (Std. Dev.) Regression Coeﬃcients (Std. Errors)
Owned Plots Leased Plots
(N =9 4 5 ) ( N = 563) FYMa Nitrogenb Phosphatec
log(total area) 3.23 3.45 0.427* 0.335* 0.817*
(1.23) (1.07) (0.172) (0.123) (0.159)
Outside village 0.068 0.096 -1.56* -0.180 -1.11*
(0.51) (0.380) (0.489)
Flat topography 0.797 0.886 0.620 -0.258 -0.009
(0.485) (0.353) (0.454)
log(value/acre) 9.49 9.44 0.699* 0.251 0.498
(1.03) (1.03) (0.332) (0.231) (0.297)
Canal Irrigation:
Perennial 0.222 0.455 2.42* 0.531 0.516
(1.02) (0.730) (0.939)
Seasonal 0.210 0.195 2.22* -0.684 -0.494
(0.96) (0.677) (0.871)
Groundwater:
Good quality 0.415 0.322 2.52* -0.170 0.216
(0.854) (0.619) (0.797)
Brackish 0.051 0.060 0.402 1.15 0.374
(1.40) (1.00) (1.29)
Very brackish 0.030 0.080 -1.30 1.51 2.71
(2.03) (1.51) (1.95)
Soil type:
Sandy 0.189 0.210 -1.42* -0.692 -0.026
(0.656) (0.467) (0.601)
Maira 0.311 0.213 -0.666 -0.572 -0.052
(0.736) (0.531) (0.684)
Chikni 0.218 0.265 -0.535 -1.21* 0.155
(0.772) (0.560) (0.721)
p-value 0.0000 0.0571 0.0003
Notes: * denotes p-value< 0.05. Omitted categories: canal irrigation = none; groundwater = none;
soil type = clay.
a From row (9), Table 4.
b From row (1), Table 5.
c From row (4), Table 5.
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